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REGUlATION OF FIRM SIZE 
IN INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT: 
The Experience of Two Manufacturing Sectors in India 
Subhrajit Guhathaku rta 
Abstract 
This paper examines two manufacturing sectors in India and 
shows that regulation aimed at protection does not provide 
the necessary impetus for growth and survival of small indus­
tries. Rather, such regulation provides a fertile territOI)' for 
larger businesses to avail themselves of undue rents through 
protected markets and regulatory loopholes. The article also 
proposes a new role for the state to better serve the twin 
objectives of social equity and industrial growth. Such a role 
would rely on the existing coalitions of small enterprises and 
pool resources to consolidate their economic and political 
power. The article concludes that state institutions can pro­
vide a forum for small-business coalitions that would create 
conditions for all scales of operation to survive and grow 
without protective regulations. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The importance of small-scale manufacturing in a country's economy has 
been the subject of numerous studies. 1 Several studies have concluded that 
small enterprises are indispensable to the process of industrialization. Based 
on these reports, most countries, rich and poor, have instituted regulations to 
promote small businesses. 2 Perhaps the most far-reaching and controversial 
state policy in favor of small-scale industries has been the protection of these 
industries from larger competitors. India has been among the first countries 
to institute such a policy and continues to maintain a list of over 800 product 
items for the exclusive manufacture by small-scale industries. 3 How successful 
is this policyl Does it support the objectives of growth with equity that the 
Indian constitution upholdsl This article attempts to provide an answer to 
these questions through an analysis of the performance of two industrial sec­
tors in the Indian economy. 
The most significant feature of I ndia's industrial development strategy has 
been its reliance on sectorial planning and regulatory policies. Such a strategy 
seemed to be a necessary part of the effort to mobilize resources for rapid devel­
opment of the country's industrial base. Planning has also been a dominant 
part of the socialist model of development espoused by India. a model that 
emphasizes equity and distributive justice through a combination of large 
investments in the public sector and substantial inducements for small-scale 
entrepreneurship. The rest of the private sector has been subject to numerous 
regulatory controls over every aspect of industrial activity. In several respects 
the rigid regulatory structure has failed to address the dynamic nature of 
industrial development, especially with regard to the transition from publicly 
supported small-scale units to healthy, self-supporting enterprises.4 
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The two sectors selected for this study, metal furniture manufacturing and the 
electronics industry related to the manufacture of television sets, represent two 
ends of a technological continuum.  While metal furniture manufacturing relies 
on processes known for several centuries, electronic gadgetry in television, and 
its manufacturing processes, have been characterized by a rapid rate of techno­
logical change. However, policies aimed at both industries have emphasized 
small-scale production during the 1 970s. Since 1 981,  the electronic industries 
have benefited from increased liberalization and the relaxation of licensing 
restrictions. In contrast, the metal furniture industries are still reserved for ex­
clusive manufacture in the small-scale sector. 
The different treatment of the two industrial sectors in the last decade under­
scores certain assumptions about their ability to contribute to I ndia's industrial 
growth and their relation to the wider social structure of the country. There is 
widespread belief that consumer electronic items such as television receivers 
require a level of sophistication in manufacturing processes that precludes parti­
cipation by most of the uneducated and unskilled labor force. It is also alleged 
that larger scale operations inevitably substitute capital for labor, thus aggravat­
ing the unemployment situation. 5 Furthermore, relaxation of capacity restric­
tions and import liberalization are deemed justif�able in the case of electronic 
items as a means of keeping abreast of 'new' technologies, while 'older' indus­
tries are obligated to maintain their outmoded processes to accommodate the 
large, unskilled labor force. 
This investigation of two technologically disparate sectors of the Indian 
economy dispels a number of myths that permeate industrial policy decisions. 
The evidence suggests that although the two sectors are dissimilar in several 
respects, the operational differences between them are not significant. Simple 
econometric tests are performed with data from the Annual Survey of Industry 
to show that the differences in average value added per factory are primarily a 
function of invested capital for the manufacturing unit, irrespective of the type 
of manufacturing activity. These tests substantiate the thesis that contribution 
of technological sophistication in explaining changes in value added for both 
industries is negligible. Also, contrary to expectations, television manufacturing 
and the manufacture of metal furniture do not attract vastly different types of 
entrepreneurs with respect to their social and educational background. More 
importantly, a small survey of entrepreneurs in the two sectors shows surprising 
similarity in strategies for market penetration. Such strategies are known to 
rely on rent-seeking opportunities resulting from the rigidities in industrial poli­
cies and the bureaucratic system. 
II. INDIAN INDUSTRIAL POLICIES: 
UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS AND STATED OBJECTIVES 
Before the 1 980s, I ndian industrial policies affecting both metal furniture and 
television sectors included a strong preference for small-scale manufacturing. 
In the case of metal furniture, this predilection led to its inclusion in the list of 
items exclusively reserved for the small-scale sector during the Fourth Five Year 
Plan ( 1 969-74). The Fourth Plan period was also significant as it ushered in the 
age of television in the country and established the foundations of the television 
industry. The policy framework for television favored the small-scale and public 
sector in licensing new units, which was in conformity with the country's gen­
eral commitments to self-reliance and distributive equity. As a result, the two 
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sectors operated under very similar policies that reflected a belief in the small­
scale sector's ability to promote a number of broad social objectives aside 
from contributing to economic growth. 
One major difference existed between the two sectors that policymakers 
could not ignore. The metal furniture industry already included at least half a 
dozen firms that were large and well-established. The survival of small enter­
prises was contingent upon control of the indiscriminate growth of these large 
firms. As a result, the production capacity of the large firms was frozen at the 
existing levels and further expansion was disallowed. Nonetheless, small-scale 
reservation policies instituted investment ceilings for all firms . in the industry. 
This severely restricted the ability of small enterprises to compete with the large 
firms that had already created a brand image backed by investments in quality. 
The television industry, on the other hand, faced no such growth ceilings. 
Since it was a new industry, licensing was an adequate tool in limiting the parti­
cipation of large private firms. Also, most manufacturing units started with very 
similar initial levels of investment and faced similar circumstances. All entrepre­
neurs in this industry started small and were confident that their products had 
a ready market. As a result of producer homogeneity, further restrictions on 
investment limits were unnecessary. Another important aspect of the television 
industry was its rapid growth fueled by pent-up demand and the proliferation of 
television broadcasts. Under these circumstances, all sectors of the television 
industry enjoyed significant returns on investments. The rapidly expanding 
demand also induced indiscriminate licensing of new, small-scale manufacturing 
units and meant almost automatic approvals for capacity expansion. Unlike 
the metal furniture industry, differences in product quality and price among 
various brands of television sets are minimal. 
The policy to regulate industrial size and structure in these two sectors was 
a deliberate attempt to meet a number of stated objectives. These objectives, 
as reiterated by all I ndustrial Policy Resolutions and Five Year Plans, underlie 
socialist ideals of growth with distributive equity. There is little debate about 
the relevance of these espoused objectives. However, the policy instl\lments 
used to achieve them have often been severely criticized. Table 1 presents an 
evaluation of the small-scale sector policies in terms of their stated objectives 
and consequences. It is important to note the unintended effects of these poli­
cies. They suggest the need for a complete re-evaluation of the policy instru­
ments and of the underlying theoretical foundations. 
Notwithstanding the theoretical validity of the fundamental assumptions in 
policymaking, the policy instl\lments designed to direct industrial strategy have 
often been ineffective. In certain instances, over-ambitious policies with multi­
farious objectives have resulted in unanticipated effects that undermine the 
original objectives and create unacceptable socioeconomic imbalances. The 
reservation of selected items for manufacture in the small-scale sector is a good 
example of a policy that has been used to the advantage of the forces it was 
meant to control. There are, of course, some trade-offs that are made con­
sciously, as most forms of market intervention have associated costs. How 
such costs and benefits are distributed is also an important part of policymak­
ing. However, careful evaluations of costs and benefits cannot be accom­
plished in a theoretical vacuum. Even in cases where policies have solid theo­
retical foundations, contextual peculiarities can confound realization of the 
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Table 1 
Theoretical Foundations and Underlying Assumptions 
in Small-Scale Sector Policies 
s-JI.sale 
Pol" n-etlcal ......... Uni......._. � Foundaliono Aoou•plion - -
Generate Capitol intensity Limited techno- I'Jolifer.ation ol High cost and 
.- increases with logical and smal� !:�"""� employment size; capital =="t units 
at low cast JI<OductMty lois ol scale 
decreases with absence ol economies 
size economies 
ol scale 
Increase 1"'-ies ol  Domestic Diwtse industrial Pnxlucts not com-
production monopoly &  markets are base; increasing potitiw intemo-
ol cansumer oligopoly; pn>tected; varie!}: ol tional.r- high 
Items; achieve nWbt concen- substantial man acturing cast 
self-sufficiency tration teD to balriers operations protection c::tion to entty 
efficient 
levels 
Facilitate Social theories Modernization Continued exis- Avonian to high 
the utiliza. ol cultunl breaks down tence ol tradi- technology; tion ol Identity; traditional tional orts and inability to 
traditional continuity customs and crafts in change attitudes 
skills through the values some foom 
presentation 
ol traditional 
modes 
Raise Theories ol Existence ol Created jobs for job insecurity; 
incomes deve=-nt surplus labor; the unskilled and depressed wages; 
� throu industrial :�r.:.,�ucated unemployment industriali- employment and undemnpioy· 
zation olfets substan- ment among the 
tial income- educated 
generating and skilled 
opportunities 
Make 1"'-ies ol  Low technologi· � ol handi- Low imap ol 
industries companotive cal input; crafts and the country's 
export· advantap; product type semi-finished manufacturing 
oriented availability ol and quality goods; some capabilities 
cheap labOr adequate to manufactured abroad 
stimulate products exported 
demand to less-
industrialized 
countries 
Remove Regional Locational Industrial Lack ol infrastruc· 
regional deWiopment advantages or facilities ture increases 
disparities theories; create :esa:�r:r built in costs; fragmen· 'basic' designated tation ol capital 
employment ::.�� backward areas; leading !O loss ol employment for economoes 
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original objectives. Thus, ambiguities embedded in social theories provide a 
fertile territory for adopting a populist agenda, devoid of substantive founda­
tions that often serve the interest of the dominant classes. 6 
In the face of inadequate theory and tenuous assumptions, policymakers are 
forced to rely on strong conjecture and the prevailing political agenda. Under 
such circumstances close monitoring and evaluation of the effects of policies 
are necessary. This research provides an evaluation of small-scale sector poli­
cies by examining the perfonnance and emerging trends in two different sec­
tors of the Indian economy. The two sectors selected for this study capture 
the variation in a number of qualitative variables, especially those related to 
technology, that can infonn the operation of other sectors of the economy. 
I l l. HOW DIFFERENT ARE THE TWO SECTORSl 
Metal furniture and television-receiver manufacturing activities are obviously 
different in several respects. The actual and, in many cases, superficial differ­
ences have become the justification for the use of divergent policy instruments 
for the two sectors. While reservation for the small-scale sector, which entails 
barriers to investment and entry, continues to persist in the case of the metal 
furniture industry, television manufacturers can expand operations and create 
new markets. The functioning of the Department of Electronics as a separate 
body to expedite procedures and promote the interest of all electronics indus­
tries confinns their favored status. furthennore, a more liberalized industrial 
environment with less regulation has provided the required impetus for their 
rapid growth and improved perfonnance. 7 Can the lessons of liberalization in 
the case of television manufacturing apply to other 'low-profile' industries as 
well? The following investigation will attempt to provide an answer to this 
question by looking at significant similarities and differences between the two 
sectors. 
The perceived differences between the two sectors are based on three major 
attributes of the industries: 
a. Sociological aspects; these include entrepreneurial and employee char­
acteristics, and styles of management, among others; 
b. Economic aspects; these arise from technological characteristics of the 
products which, in tum, determine factor proportions, intensities, and 
productivities; and 
c. Industrial otganizational aspects; which include industry size, structure, 
concentration, and linkages. 
It should be noted here that the industrial attributes listed above are not inde­
pendent of each other and are also affected by the regulatory environment. 
Sociological Aspects: In spite of the common impression of metal furniture 
as part of the traditional 'low-tech' sector, evidence suggests that, in several 
respects, it is similar to 'high-tech' industries like television manufacturing. The 
similarity is especially strong with regard to the entrepreneurs who are manag­
ing the industries and the employees who participate in their operation. The 
data on entrepreneurial characteristics in the two industry sectors, presented 
in Table 2, was obtained from a survey conducted by this author between janu­
ary and May 1990. The overall percentages for all size categories show that, 
for both industries, almost one-third of the businesses are owned and operated 
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Table Z 
Entrepreneurial Characteristics by Firm Size 
All Industrial 
Sector 
Entrepreneurial 
Attributes Larxe Medium Small Firms 
Metal 
furniture 
. ���:�: · · · · · · s .  < 4 · · · · · • · 7 
: •• : • ••• ,.,:.(l?f• . •miiU�mt· · ·  : :  • • . • • • • • •••• • • •••• ;>JQ • • • • •• • • .• ••• :h1Q . ... .. . . .. . . . �.J•· ······ · ····•'· . . . · · 
College (%) 1 00  75 57 75 
Family (%) 40 so 14  31 
Experience (%) 60 so 43 so 
Television 
. Sample $iii!: . · • .  4 7 5 
=�=�Zk} · · · ··
·
· · · · · · · · ·
·
· · · · · • ·:.::•400 . . . . . • . : . .tef100 . •••• ) :'11t ••.•. . .. ; . . 
College (%) 100 1 00  94 94 
Family (%) 75 43 0 37 
Experience (%) 75 57 20 so 
Notes: 
1 .  College (%) = Percent of entrepreneurs in specific size categories holding college 
degrees. 
2. Family (%) = Percent of entrepreneurs in specific size categories belonging to 
traditional business families. 
3. Experience (%) = Percent of entrepreneurs in specific size categories having 
previous business experience. 
4. Number of firms surveyed = 16 in each industJy sector. 
5. Turnover can also be interpreted as total annual sales. 
6. Exchange rate for mid-1 990 was approximately Rs. 1 7.30 to USS 1 .00. 
Source: Interviews conducted by the author between january and May 1 990. 
by well-known, business-oriented communities like the Marwaris, the Sindhis, 
and in a smaller number of cases, the Parsis. These communities together con­
trol the lion's share of I ndia's large business houses. Furthermore, exactly one­
half of all businesses surveyed in both sectors were operated by entrepreneurs 
with previous business experience. Educational qualifications also rank high in 
the attributes of the entrepreneurs, with over one-quarter holding college 
degrees. In fact, an overwhelming majority of the entrepreneurs are educated 
urbanites irrespective of the type of industry. Thus, the stated objective to 
help the small artisans through small-scale policies is probably not met. Over 
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one-half of all small-scale entrepreneurs surveyed in both the sectors hold 
concurrent jobs in other services or industries. This strongly suggests that 
subsidies for small-scale businesses have had an urban middle-class bias 
despite attempts at industrial dispersion out of metropolitan regions. 
There are, of course, some notable differences in the attributes of entrepre­
neurs in the two industry sectors. The small industrial sector in television, as 
defined in Table 2, seems to have unleashed significant entrepreneurial talents 
outside the traditional business communities. These entrepreneurs are also, 
on average, more educated than their counterparts in metal furniture industries. 
This can be partly explained by the fact that the industry-wide. figures (the 'Total' 
column) show a higher incidence of educationally qualified entrepreneurs in 
television than in the metal furniture industry. However, in business experi­
ence, the small-scale entrepreneurs in television are well behind their counter­
parts in the metal furniture industry. 
The labor force engaged in metal furniture and television manufacturing does 
not show any marked difference in educational and social characteristics. The 
average firm size for the television sector is over twice that of metal furniture 
industries, which explains the larger number of trained engineers and profes­
sionals employed in television industries. According to the Annual Survey of 
Industries data for the fiscal years 1 972-73 to 1986-87, the difference between 
the number of 'employees' (all persons on the payroll) and the number of 
'workers' (employees involved in actual production process) for the electronic 
equipment sector, which includes television, averaged 40 persons, with a 
standard deviation of about 7. The same figures for metal furniture were 12  
and 2 ,  respectively. This is not surprising since the metal furniture firms are, 
on average, smaller in size and, therefore, require fewer management-level 
personnel. However, the workers involved in production in both industries 
did not possess any special practical skills or training. 
The use of female labor is especially common in television manufacturing 
firms. Those television industries surveyed had between 20 and 50 percent 
women in their labor force. The women were used almost exclusively in assem­
bly operations which do not require any knowledge beyond the use of simple 
tools. Even the technical personnel used for supervision were, for the most 
part, trained in the polytechnics and industrial training institutes, rather than 
engineering degree-awarding institutions. Contrary to expectations, the few 
engineers who were maintained on the payrolls were involved in sales and 
management instead of design or production-related jobs. 
As a result of the reservation policies for the small-scale sector, the metal fur­
niture firms are usually much smaller than television firms. Due to the metal 
furniture industry's small scale, the requirement for management personnel is 
also small. However, workers engaged in metal furniture manufacturing. on 
average, command a higher salary than television manufacturing employees. 
The difference in emoluments per employee (salary + benefits) between the 
two sectors has been increasing since 1 980, as shown in Figure 1 .  This growing 
disparity in labor compensation can be explained by several factors, including 
worker organization and management styles. The larger metal furniture manu­
facturing firms are also older establishments with a history of organized labor 
activities. Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, the few large firms in 
metal furniture have managed to eliminate the competitive pressures that 
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Figure 1 
Growth in Total Emoluments in Metal Furniture 
and Electronic Equipment Industries: 1973-1987 
1 2  
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accompany an increasing number of finns in the same category. Thus, these 
firms have carved out comfortable market shares and can afford to increase 
labor compensation, in spite of the growing numbers of very small units.& 
In contrast, the rapidly increasing electronic industries have forced indi­
vidual units to economize and develop more efficient organizations. The 
ensuing competitive pressures resulted in a tight lid on wages to keep costs 
under control. Also, several management-level personnel indicated that the 
use of unskilled female labor and engineers from technical training institutes is 
a strategy to keep wages, as well as expectations, low. Worker organizations 
in this industry are typically weak or non-existent. 
The similarities in entrepreneurial profiles and types of employed labor in the 
two sectors, especially in the large and medium-scale units, dispute the argu­
ment that technologically disparate sectors have different sociological roles in 
I ndia's development. The reservation of certain 'traditional' industries for 
small-scale manufacturing does not necessarily affect the size or composition 
of either the entrepreneurial class or the labor force. I nstead, such regulation 
creates rigidities in the bureaucratic system that provide further opportunities 
for exploitative 'rent-seeking' by the dominant classes. 
Economic Aspects: Econometric enumeration of the characteristics of pro­
duction functions can shed some light on the use of factors in the two selected 
industries. Is it true that the metal furniture industry is less capital-intensive 
than the electronic equipment sector? Are there significant differences in tech-
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nological inputs between the two industries? A number of simple econometric 
tests will attempt to provide some answers to these questions. The data from 
Annual Sutvey of lndustly for the years 1972-73 to 1 986-87, for both sectors, is 
used to estimate a modified Cobb-Douglas form of production function. The 
average industry-wide statistics for each year for the input and output variables 
constitute the cases for analysis. Due to the small number of data points availa­
ble in this case, more sophisticated tests are not possible. However, some cau­
tious but logical conclusions may be attempted from this analysis. The hypo­
theses tested can be simply stated as follows: 
a. Despite expectations, technical change plays a minor role in the 
growth of output in both the industries; and 
b. The partial contribution of labor in the growth of output of both 
industries is very small, while most of the change in output can be 
attributed to change in invested capital in the two industries. 
A neoclassical production function having two productive inputs and exhibit­
ing disembodied technological change may be written in the most general form 
Q = F(K.,L-t) (1 ) 
where t denotes time and Q, K, and L represent output (value-added), capi­
tal, and labor, respectively. A modified Cobb-Douglas form of equation ( 1 )  
may be written as 
Q = A eSI � Lb eu (2) 
E[e) = O  
The term A denotes the constant of proportionality and u is a random varia­
ble assumed to be normally distributed in the sample with a mean value of 0. 
The logarithmic form of (2) provides a first-order equation: 
lnQ = C + st + a lnK + b lnL  (3) 
The coefficients s, a, and b represent the contribution of technical change, 
and the change in capital and labor inputs, respectively, in explaining output 
changes. Ordinary least square estimates of the coefficients for the two indus­
tries, metal furniture and electronic equipment, are presented below: 
Metal Furniture: 
LnQ = 5.98 + 0.006 t + 0.82 LnK + (-1 .7) LnL (4) 
t-statistic: (2.2) (0.021 )  (1 .86) (-2.5) 
(R2 = 0.57; F = 4.5; Durbin Watson = 1 .7) 
Electronic Equipment: 
LnQ = -3.6 + 0.01 5 t + 0.71 LnK + 0.61 LnL (5) 
t-statistic: (-.9) (0.35) (1 .05) (0.69) 
(R2 = 0.83; F = 16.5; Durbin Watson = 1 .7) 
The results show insignificant contribution of technical change (coefficient 
of f) in affecting value added for both the industries. More surprisingly, the 
unconstrained model shows a neptive contribution of labor in metal furniture 
industries. The negative value was accompanied by a high t-statistic (·2.5), 
suggesting that this value is significantly different from 0. This points to an 
inefficient production process that can only be sustained through regulation 
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and protection. As may be expected, both the models become more robust 
when the 'time trend' variable is removed. The equations for a model without 
technological change (or 'time trend') are presented below: 
Metal Furniture Industry 
LnQ = 6.0 + 0.82 LnK + (-1 .69) LnL (6) 
t-stafistic: (2.6) (3.6) (-2.9) 
(R2 z .57; F E  7.4; Durbin Watson = 1 .7) 
Electronic Eguipment Industry 
LnQ = -2.23 + 0.93 LnK + 0.3 LnL (7) 
t-stafistic: (-3.4) (4.4) ( 1 .96) 
(R2 = .83; F = 26.9; Durbin Watson = 1 .7) 
The significant negative contribution of labor in the metal furniture industries 
suggests uneconomic use of labor in this sector. This result also indicates 
underinvestment that, perhaps, follows from the investment ceiling imposed 
on the metal furniture industry. However, both industries seem to be capital­
intensive, using a significantly higher proportion of capital than labor for each 
unit of value added. · 
In a more constrained model with constant returns to scale, the differences 
between the two industries almost totally disappear. The model now assumes 
that the contribution of disembodied technical change is minimal, and therefore 
the time trend variable is discarded. It may be stated as: 
Q = A  K'l L(1 -a) (8) 
A first-order equation is derived through logarithmic transformation: 
Ln (Q/l.) = C + a Ln (�L) (9) 
In this constrained model, the factor productivities are assumed to be a 
homogeneous function of the factor proportions. The ordinary least-square 
estimates of the coefficient a for the two industries is provided below: 
Metal Furniture: 
Ln (Q/L) = -1 .62 + 0.76 Ln 1/Y'L) 
t-statistic: (-1 .24) (2.38) 
1R2 = .32; F = 5.6; Durbin Watson : 2.3) 
Electronic Eguiprnent: 
Ln (Q/L) = -1 .85 + 0.73 Ln (/Y'L) 
t-statistic: (-3.0) (4.6) 
(R2 = .64; F = 21 .2; Durbin Watson = 1 . 1 )  
(1 0) 
(1 1 ) 
The constrained model highlights a number of similar attributes in the two 
industries. It may be observed that the relationship between labor productivity 
and capital-to-labor ratio is almost identical (value of a is .76 in metal furniture 
and . 73 in electronic equipment) . Also, the intercepts of the regression lines 
for the two industries are close (at 0 labor productivity, both industries register 
a capital-to-labor ratio between 2 and 2.5). However, there seems to be a signi­
ficant positive autocorrelation error in the equation for electronic equipment. 
When a correction for such an error was attempted, the coefficients seemed 
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to move even closer to those in the model for the metal furniture industry (ln 
Q/1. = -1 .77 + .75 ln K,IL; using the Cochrane-Orcutt method). Figures 2 and 
3 illustrate the regression lines for the two sectors. 
Industrial Organizational Aspects: Probably the most widely accepted justifi­
cation for industrial regulation is related to the control of monopolies, oligop­
olies, cartels, and other forms of collusion among producers. Since economic 
theories suggest that such collusion results in socially inefficient outcomes, 
most countries have legislation similar to the anti-trust legislation in the U .S., 
and the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices (MRTP) Act in India. Such 
legislation ensures competition among producers and compels them to use 
the most efficient production process. However, in the metal furniture indus­
try in I ndia, small-scale reservation policies seem to have eliminated competi­
tive pressures on the large manufacturers. Thus, the concentration within this 
industry is high compared to the television manufacturing industry, which faces 
few restrictive policies. Table 3 compares some of the available concentration 
ratios for the two sectors. 
The two industries exhibit very different characteristics with respect to indus­
trial concentration. The concentration in the metal furniture industry is height­
ened by the brand image projected by the large firms, which is sustained 
through effective marketing strategies. The largest firms are also growing at a 
modest rate of between 1 0  and 20 percent annually in spite of limitations in 
capacity expansion. Although the level of concentration is far lower in the tele­
vision industry, there is reason to believe that concentration in this industry is 
also increasing rapidly. 9 However, industry stalwarts believe that this is a 
temporary phenomenon and several other firms have the capacity to chal­
lenge the market leaders. 1 0 The largest firms in the metal furniture industry, 
on the other hand, face no such challenges since investment caps on growing 
small-scale units limit their ability to improve product quality and launch an 
effective marketing strategy that is essential for increasing market shares. 
Prior to 1 981, both industrial sectors in this study were characterized by 
strong state control of their backward linkages to raw material inputs. The tele­
vision industry depended upon a number of imported components, the flow 
of which was regulated by the state. This dependence decreased substantially 
in the 1 980s with the indigenous manufacture of many components and almost 
unrestricted import of other items that were not available in the country. Steel, 
the essential raw material for metal furniture, is regulated through the Minerals 
and Metals Trading Corporation (MMTC) and Steel Authority of India (SAI L), 
and strict purchase quotas on this commodity are enforced. Superior quality 
steel is even more scarce, and a considerable portion of this item is imported 
through state agencies to meet the demand. Inadequate distribution systems 
and an overall shortage of supply have resulted in unregulated trading in steel. 
Since the large firms maintain long-term contracts and high inventories, their 
dependence on the 'open market' for steel is minimal. In  contrast, few small 
manufacturers are able to obtain steel from regulated channels and are forced 
to rely heavily on the open market. Consequently, they pay a premium of 1 5  
to 2 0  percent over the stipulated prices. Furthermore, the limited amount of 
high-quality steel inevitably finds its way to the large firms exclusively. Thus, 
the small-scale manufacturers are forced to settle for high prices and low· 
quality inputs that restrict their ability to compete effectively in high-end 
product markets. 
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Table 3 
Concentration in Metal Furniture and Television 
Manufacturing Industries, 1987-88 estimates 
Industry 
Sectors 
Metal Furniture 
Television 
Metal Furniture 
Television 
84.69 
48.61 
Four Finn Concentration Ratios 
93.31 
69.63 
97.29 
88.99 
1 00  
100 
I ndustry-wide Concentration Ratios• 
30 to 50 
22 
N/A 
31 .5  
N/A 
40.3 
35 to 60 
45.3 
Note: • = Aggregate industry totals are not available due to a large number 
of unregistered units; the figure supplied is the range of 'best esti· 
mates' supplied by the concerned unit, their competitors, and a 
number of dealers. 
Sources: 1V Veopar journal; Economic Intelligence Service, Center for 
Monitoring the Indian Economy, Bombay, 1 989; Confederation of 
Engineering I ndustries, Directory of Members, February 1 988; and 
personal interviews. 
The state also influences the demand for products manufactured in these sec­
tors through a variety of means. Taxation is, perhaps, the most direct means of 
affecting demand. Curiously, the high-end products of the metal furniture and 
television industries face almost identical aggregate tax rates. The combined 
excise (a fonn of sales tax) and local taxes for color television receivers is about 
55 percent of the ex-factory cost, while that of steel furniture manufactured in 
large manufacturing units ranges between 50 and 55 percent. However, differ­
ential tax rates apply to metal furniture manufacturers according to their total 
output, with low-volume producers receiving preferential treatment. Thus, 
incentives of maintaining small levels of output are greater for the smaller firms. 
In  the case of television, taxation is not based on firm size, but on the type of 
product, with black-and-white sets attracting concessional rates of taxation. 
Since most television manufacturers produce both color and black-and-white 
sets, the taxation policies shift the relative demand for the type of products 
with little effect on the aggregate production levels of the manufacturing unit. 
While output-specific taxation continues to be biased for certain size classes of 
firms, product-specific taxation affects all firms equally in the specific industry. 
There is evidence to believe that the differential taxation has led to differences 
in dynamism and competitive endeavor of individual firms in each industry. 
This partly explains the highly competitive market in television relative to the 
metal furniture industry. 
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The state's role in the expansion of the television industry and in encouraging 
the small-scale sector within metal furniture manufacturing is substantial. The 
proliferation of television broadcasts has no doubt played a major role in the 
rapid growth of the television industry. However, this relationship has gener­
ated benefits for both the state and the industry. While the industry profited 
from increased sales, the state also benefited from the increased revenue from 
television sales. Such a symbiotic relationship creates conditions for the pur­
suit of mutual goals through long-term commitments. Small-scale firms in metal 
furniture manufacturing, on the other hand, remain dependent on the state 
because incentives for doing so are substantial. Prior to 1 986, the government 
purchase organization, Director General of Supplies and Disposal, procured 
metal furniture items exclusively from small-scale firms. However, this relation­
ship has been discontinued due to persistent complaints about quality of materi­
als and workmanship. This loss of government contracts resulted in closure of 
a large number of small-scale firms and highlights the transient nature of depen­
dency relationships. 
A comparison of state involvement in redefining maricet structures of the two 
industries suggests that differences between the sectors can be largely attribu­
ted to policies affecting them. Since the sociological and economic aspects· of 
the two industries show little inherent disparity, similar policies for the two sec­
tors should yield similar results. Notwithstanding the above conclusion, this 
analysis fails to justify the reservation of metal furniture items exclusively for 
small-scale manufacturing units. The next section examines the incidence of 
policy-induced and maricet-induced 'rent-seeking' in the two industry sectors. 
Both forms of rent-seeking can be destructive; however, maricet-induced rent­
seeking in a highly competitive maricet may generate a certain amount of utility 
to both consumers and the producers. In contrast, rent-seeking resulting from 
rigidities in bureaucratic procedure creates social wastes that are politically diffi­
cult to eliminate. The incentive for those who benefit from undue rents, as well 
as for those who actually have a right to the rents, generates an inertia for con­
tinuing the policy of reservation for exclusive manufacture in the small-scale 
sector. 
IV. STRATEGIC RESPONSES TO POLICY 
A major part of informed policymaking is the search for sound theoretical 
foundations. However, the assumptions of these theories often fail to include 
strategic responses of the concerned actors to ensuing policies. Experience has 
shown that the larger and more powerful actors in the maricet make strategic 
choices that are often not anticipated. Also, interventions in the maricet are 
costly in terms of policing and administration. Thus, the consequences of well­
intended policies to smooth socioeconomic imperfections often create a spiral 
of cumulative imbalances in the maricet process.1 1  The protection granted to 
the small-scale sector in I ndia has provided opportunities for the large industries 
to reduce costs and increase profits in spite of government efforts to curtail 
their monopoly powers. A theoretical understanding of the strategies for ensur­
ing long-term profits in large industries falls under the general rubric of rent­
seeking theories. 
Most imperfectly competitive maricets generate opportunities for both 
policy-induced and maricet-induced forms of rent-seeking. An analysis of the 
maricet structure of the two sectors, metal furniture and television manufactur-
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ing, shows that while policy-induced rent-seeking is prevalent in metal furniture 
industries, television manufacturers rely on other fonns of 'non-price' competi­
tion. Aggressive sales promotion through non-price mechanisms prevalent in 
the television industry, although wasteful in many instances, has some advan­
tages which policy-induced rent-seeking lacks. An attempt will also be made to 
explain the persistence of the policy of reservation for smaii-5Cille manufacturing 
of metal furniture items for over two decades. An examination of various levels 
of rent-seeking opportunities can provide some insights into the incentives for 
all concerned actors to maintain reservation policies. 
There is some debate about whether advertising and promotional expendi­
tures are social wastes. However, they are necessary in certain kinds of mar­
kets. When income elasticity of demand for a commodity is less than unity and 
inversely proportional to income, demand for that commodity may not grow 
steadily over time. In such cases, the demand function becomes relatively flat 
after an initial stage when it shows the normal positive relationship. Both tele­
vision and metal furniture items may be viewed to have demand functions that 
are relatively flat after an initial positive increase, as people do not necessarily 
consume more of these commodities with increased incomes. Thus, the rate 
of growth of consumption of these products can increase in only two ways: 
( 1 )  grow with the growth of total market, i.e., population growth, or (2) grow 
at the expense of competitors. 1 2 Where population in relevant income categor­
ies is not growing rapidly, firms need to resort to competitive marketing to 
maintain their market share. Each firm is, therefore, compelled to observe the 
strategies of its competitors that include, in the absence of substantial price 
variation, the introduction of new models and an increase in advertising expen­
diture. This scenario adequately explains the increased advertising expendi­
tures incurred by television manufacturers and the rapid growth in new televi­
sion models since the decline of sales in this industry during 1 988-89. 
The increase in advertising by television manufacturers, according to the rent­
seeking theorists, can be viewed as social waste. The assumption is that adver­
tising has little social utility if it does not increase the total market for the 
industry. However, more mainstream economists contend that to the extent 
advertisements shift preferences for one brand of product over another, it must 
have some utility for both the consumers who switch to the advertised brand 
and the producer of that commodity. 1 3 Given that 'successful' advertisements 
are probably not socially wasteful, there is still a possibility that all firms follow 
the same strategy, resulting in the cancellation of each other's efforts. In such 
a scenario, the argument that advertising is socially wasteful can be very compel­
ling. However, a more favorable perspective on advertising expenditure may 
be found if we look at the search costs and the costs of information accrued to 
the consumers of a commodity. 
In a market differentiated by small variations in appearance, functions, and 
uses, as in the case of most consumer electronic products, consumers are over­
whelmed by choices. The search cost to a consumer of such a commodity 
would be a multiplicative function of the number of manufacturers, the number 
of models available in each brand, and the rate at which new models are intro­
duced and older ones are discontinued. With over two hundred television 
manufacturers in I ndia and over a thousand television models, the search 
costs to a typical consumer can be quite high. This is accentuated by rapidly 
evolving technology, which contributes to the introduction of new models in 
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quick succession. Perhaps one possible way to estimate search costs would 
be to observe the increase in the number of consumer journals and in their 
sales or subscriptions. Such an analysis is beyond the scope of the present 
research. However, it is safe to assume that search costs to consumers of tele­
vision sets in I ndia are increasing as rapidly as the advertising expenditures of 
the manufacturers. The increased costs of 'non-price' competition are partly 
responsible for providing information to the consumers and reducing their 
search costs. Therefore, they do not fall into the category of 'social waste'. It 
is also possible that successful advertising will make the demand curve of a 
specific product more inelastic, thus generating monopoly profits for the produ­
cer. But, to the extent that similar producers and similar products exist, profit 
margins will not be abnormal. 
In state-created monopolies, as in metal furniture manufacturing, very little 
of the monopoly profits are transferred to the consumers. Especially when an 
established brand is protected from competition through regulation, the need 
for transfer of monopoly rents to consumers in the form of price or non-price 
methods is minimal. There may be a need to transfer some of these rents to 
the state to maintain their privileged status but, as discussed later, even this is 
unnecessary in the case of large-scale metal furniture manufacturers. In fact, 
the options for rent-seeking have been increased with the introduction of pro­
duct lines reserved for the exclusive manufacture in the small-scale firms. The 
incentives and subsidies provided for small-scale units actually attract sizeable 
resources from the large operations to bypass regulations and avail themselves 
of such lower rents. The existence of a large number of 'ghost' small-scale units 
(which exist only on paper), as well as operating units owned by subsidiaries 
of large businesses, confirms the suspicion that incentives are being appropria­
ted as rents by owners of large businesses. 1 4 Of course, the resources spent 
on obtaining these rents are social wastes and are proportional to the expected 
benefits. The larger the economic incentives offered by the state to particular 
sectors of the economy, the larger will be the resources wasted in obtaining 
these benefits. However, this does not imply that small-scale businesses should 
be left to fend for themselves. The society has a stake in creating and maintain­
ing competitive pressure on the monopolists as well as in avoiding a sharply 
divided society. A framework for reducing rent-seeking opportunities, while 
providing incentives for small-scale entrepreneurial activity, is suggested in a 
later section. 
let us now consider a state-created monopoly whose competitors are very 
small-scale units that independently, and without collusion, have little power 
to influence the market. The monopolist is aware of his competition and 
refrains from drastic price increases, fearing reduced sales. The monopolist is 
also aware of its superior brand image and reinforces this from time to time 
with sophisticated advertising. For simplicity, assume that the monopolist is 
facing constant supply costs and declining demand. This scenario is a close 
approximation of the metal furniture industry in I ndia. Without resorting to 
sophisticated models, a simple conceptual diagram of rent transfers is presented 
in Figure 4. In this case, Pc is the price of the commodity under perfect com­
petition and is equal to the marginal cost. Pm is the price charged by the 
monopolist and Pm +t is the final monopoly price including taxes. Since taxes 
constitute a very high portion of the cost to consumers (about 50 percent in 
the case of metal furniture), they contribute to a much larger loss in social wei 
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Figure 4 
fare, denoted by the triangle xyz. If we assume, as the government does, that 
very close substitutes are available for the product manufactured by the monop­
olist, then an argument can be made that the revenues denoted by xyz are trans­
ferred to the small-scale manufacturers. Therefore, social losses are not entirely 
the triangle xyz but somewhat lower, with the small manufacturers gaining from 
the increased taxation. Thus, the incentive for all concerned actors - the state, 
the monopolist, and the small entrepreneurs - in keeping the status quo is 
great; and this explains why the policy of reservation is difficult to eliminate in 
spite of heavy social losses. 
Social losses accrue because, in reality, the scenario is a little different. First, 
if the consumer does not consider the products of the small-scale manufacturers 
to be close substitutes, the demand may be postponed. Second, the desirability 
of the product manufactured by the monopolist may increase, causing a shift in 
the demand function to E. This can occur if: (a) small-scale manufacturers are 
unable to match the monopolist in the quality of the products, which could 
cause adverse publicity for their products; (b) the monopolist uses effective 
advertising to increase the gulf between his product and the other producers, 
using a small portion of his monopoly profits; 1 5 or (c) there is a widespread 
perception that high-quality products, similar to the ones manufactured by the 
monopolist, will not be available from other producers at better prices in the 
near future. The fact that consumers often have to wait for several months to 
receive metal furniture merchandise from established industrial houses, even 
though similar items are available from small-scale producers, indicates that 
demand is increasing without a decrease in real prices. 
The shift in the demand function offers more favorable opportunities to 
extract rent both for the monopolist and the state. The monopolist, however, 
is wary about raising prices (to P nl too drastically to clear the market. Instead 
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production is increased slightly, together with a modest price increase. The 
quantity produced is now Qt + 1 at the higher price, Pt + 1, as shown in Figure 4. 
The loss in revenue and consumer utility is the la'Ber triangle x1y1 z1 . Thus, 
the more desirable the product of the monopolist becomes, social waste 
increases along with the benefits to the state and to the la'Be producer. Social 
costs are even greater if we assume that the la'Be producer faces increasing 
marginal costs, which is realistic considering the investment limits imposed by 
the state. The producer is compelled to use inefficient production methods 
that contribute to social losses. Furthermore, the la�Be§t share of losses 
involved in maintaining a monopoly can be attributed to the transfers to the 
state in the form of taxes. Even if one assumes that the government only acts 
in good faith to provide a number of social benefits with its rents, still we know 
that the transaction costs involved are extremely high. Thus, a la'Be share of 
the rents are dissipated in maintaining the la'Be bureaucracy rather than in 
making social investments. 
The dominant role of the bureaucracy in I ndia is well-known and well-docu­
mented.1 6  Obvioosly, the political and ideological framework of the nation­
state, as developed in India, has its own dynamics and imperatives beyond 
simplistic social welfare accounting. It is also well-known, however, that the 
Indian polity is not homogeneous; fundamental changes are taking place, albeit 
at a slow pace. Thus, it is important to point out the most glaring examples of 
social wastes through misdirected regulations so that they may serve as prime 
areas for social reform. The transformation in the electronics industry highlights 
the potential for regulatory reform in generating higher levels of growth and 
dynamism.1 7  The lessons of liberalization in the electronics industry can pro­
vide an example for several other sectors of Indian industry. Especially in 
metal furniture manufacturing, which is not unlike consumer electronic indus­
try in many important respects, the elimination of restrictions can provide the 
required impetus for higher competitiveness and superior performance. 
V. TOWARD A SOCIALLY RELEVANT SMALL-SCALE SECTOR 
POLICY 
To view all redistributive measures of the government as 'social waste' is to 
ascribe no value to the ideal of an equitable society. In  other words, if we can 
justify the end, we may be able to justify the means, which, in this case, is gov­
ernment intervention. The leakage of resources through transfers may not 
seem as irrational or unwarranted if, on some acceptable measure of social 
equity, significant progress is observed. Such measures would have to tran­
scend the narrow economic criteria of efficiency in competitive markets. How­
ever, even if social equity has some intrinsic value that justifies 'economic' 
losses, questions of the accountability of such policies do not disappear. 
Especially in the uncharted, and consequently uncertain, territory of social 
policymaking, constant evaluation is necessary to select the best possible 
means to the desired end. Thus, to the extent a more effective strategy for 
achieving a stated objective is known and applicable, the use of any other 
means would constitute a drain of social resources. 
Policies for the small-scale sector have shown elements of both successes 
and failures. One expects that the essential elements of the success stories 
are retained and adapted for spurring small-scale industrial activity while the 
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Table 4 
Achievements Recorded by Various District Industries Centers (DICs) in 
Small-Scale Industry Development, 1985-86. 
Total for Average 
Indicators of Success 396 DICs eer DIC 
1. Entrepreneurs Identified (nos.) 522,254 1 ,319 
2.  Project Profiles Prepared (nos.) 21 8,439 552 
3. New Registrations (nos.) 342,298 864 
4. New Units Established 
(a) Artisans 285,838 n2 
(b) Other Small-Scale 91,551 231 
5. Credit Provided by Financial 
Institutions (Rs. Million) 6,1 1 3. 1  1 . 54 
6. Sick Units Assisted (Nos.) 1 , 178 3 
7. Cash Subsidy (Rs Millions) 756.3 0.2 
8. Additional Employment Generated 
(No. of Persons) 1,1 48,258 2,900 
9. Units Given Technical Assistance (nos.) 50,621 1 28 
Source: Development Commissioner, Small-Scale I ndustries, "Annual 
Report of Small Industries Development Organization; 1 985-86. 
Table 5 
Growth of Small-Scale Industries 1980-86 
1.2!!!!:!! .!..2!J..:§l � � 1 984�5 � 
No. al Units CthouundS) 8 74 962 1 ,059 1 , 1 58 1 ,242 1 ,349 
Ca�mulatiw) (8.5n 11 o.on (1 0.08) (9.35) (10. 73) (8.62) 
Production at Current Prices 280,600 326,000 350,000 4 1 6,200 505,200 6 1 1 .000° 
(in Rs. Million) (29.70) ( 1 6 . 1 8) (7.36) (18 .91)  (2 1 .38) (20.94) 
Production at 1970-71 Prices 109,060 1 1 8,370 1 28,000 1 4 1 ,200 1 49,700 1 78,600 
(in Rs. Million) (8.79) (8.54) (8. 1 4) (10. 3 1 )  (6.02) ( 19 .31)  
Employment 7,1 00  7,500 7,900 8,4 1 5  9,000 9,600 
Cin thouSinds) (5.9n (5.63) (5.33) (6.52) (6.95) (6.6n 
Export at Current Prices 1 6,430 20,710 20,970 22, 1 90  25,800 N.A. 
(in Rs. Mllion) (34.0) (26.05) (1 .25) (5.82) 11 6.2n 
Notes: 
1 .  Figures in brackets indicate percentage increase over the previous year 
2. • denote estimates 
3. N.A. = Not Available 
Source: Development Commissioner, Small-Scale Industries, "Annual Report of Small 
Industries Development Organization, • 1 985·86. 
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Table & 
Plan Outlays for Small-Scale Industry Promotion 
Plan Period 
First Plan ( 1951 -56) 
Second Plan ( 1 956-61 )  
Third Plan ( 1961 -66) 
Annual Plan ( 1966-69) 
Fourth Plan ( 1969-74) 
Fifth Plan ( 1974-79) 
Annual Plan ( 1979-80) 
Sixth Plan (1 980-85) 
Seventh Plan ( 1 985-90) 
Outlay in Current Rs. Million 
52.0 
560.0 
1 , 1 30.6 
534.8 
961 .9 
2,21 7.4 
1 ,048.1 
6, 161 .0 
1 1 ,205.1 
Source: Development Commissioner, Small-Scale Industries, "Annual Report of Small 
Industries Development Organization, • 1 9BS-86. 
losing strategies are rejected. Reservation of product lines for the small-scale 
sector has been a conspicuous failure, especially in the metal furniture manufac­
turing sector. Such a restrictive policy strengthened the initial inequities while 
contributing to economic stagnation and high social losses. In  contrast, the 
small-scale units in the electronics sector have developed winning strategies 
to survive in a competitive market. Through the creation of a scheme to provide 
material, technology, and marketing support to the small-scale units in electron­
ics, the state was able to improve their competitive strength. This was achieved 
without any onerous restrictions on the activity of other sectors in the industry. 
The elaborate organizations created for promoting small-scale industry can 
claim several other successes as well. An impressive measure of their perform­
ance is presented in Table 4 for the year 1 985-86. Table 5 charts the growth 
of small-scale industries in India between 1 981 and 1 986. However, the organ­
izational structure developed to assist small-scale industries is also pursuing 
self-aggrandizement. As a result, the Plan outlays for these organizations are 
increasing sharply (Table 6). This cost cannot be sustained if real wealth is not 
created in other sectors of the economy in the short run. Therefore, unrestricted 
industrial activity to achieve scale economies must be permitted. The threat of 
foreign competition can be an effective means to make larger industries, enjoy­
ing protected markets, strive for efficiency and international competitiveness. 
This is even more critical, at present, in view of India's increasing debt burden 
and worsening terms of trade. Thus, it is necessary to provide limited support 
to activities that can stand on their own in the near future while allowing higher 
levels of industrial competitiveness through liberalization policies. 
Small industries most critically feel the lack of infrastructural services that in­
creases their costs of doing business many-fold. In spite of the best intentions 
of the state to support small-scale activity, there is a belief that it has failed in the 
most fundamental areas of government concern - the provision of public goods. 
The paucity of power, the poor maintenance oftransport facilities, and the insuf­
ficient telecommunication facilities contribute to the high cost of doing business 
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in India. The ensuing delays and red tape in transfer of commodities (including 
money) compel businesses to maintain high inventories and large amounts of 
cash on hand. Smaller industries are usually not equipped to do this and thus 
face shutdowns and idle capacity. furthermore, small units are adversely affec­
ted by their location in rural and semi-urbanized areas where infrastructure facili­
ties are especially poor. Thus, more attention must be paid to developing the 
'lifelines' of I ndia's economy, without which small businesses will not be able 
to sustain themselves and ultimately cause a drain on scarce state resources. 
Finally, progress is being made on all fronts and priorities are shifting toward 
developing a high-quality infrastructure. In areas such as telecommunication 
and electrification, substantial advancements have been made. Power genera­
tion has increased several-fold in the 1 980s, and increasing resources are being 
earmarked for future expansion. 1 8 However, certain rigidities in industrial poli­
cies persist in other areas. The political incentives for maintaining the existing 
system of extracting rents while creating social waste confound any attempt to 
relax restrictive policies, such as reservation for the small-scale sector. The 
absence of political will to take certain risks and the lack of strong commit­
ment to public service principles among most policymakers creates conditions 
for the sustenance of destructive rent-seeking and industrial stagnation. 
NOTES 
1 Most notably the works of: E. F. Schumacher, Small is Beautiful, London: Sphere Books, 
1 974; Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama: An Enquiry into the l'ollerty of Nations, London: 
Penguin, 1 968; L K. jha, The Economic Strategy for the !980s, New Delhi: Allied Pub­
lishers, 1 980; K. Prasad and T. V. S. Rama Mohan Rao, Employment Potential of Manu­
facturing Industries, New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1 977; Ruddar Dutt and K. P. M. 
Sundaram, Indian Economy, 1 6th edition, New Delhi: S. Chand & Co., 1 977, pp. 537-
538; B. C. T andon, Pattern and Technique of India's Economic Development, Allahabad: 
Chugh Publications, 1 977; the works of Ram K. Vepa, including Small Industry: Chal­
lenge of the Eighties and Small Industry in the Sewnties, both published by New Delhi: 
Vikas Publications, 1 983 and 1 971 respectively; also the highly quoted documents Inter­
national Labor Organization, Employment, Incomes and Equality: A Strategy for lncrras­
ing Productive Employment in Kenya, Geneva, 1 972; and also United Nations Industrial 
Development Organization, Subcontracting for Modernizing Economies, 1 974, and 
Effectilleness of Industrial Estates in Developing Countries, 1 978. 
2The terms 'small businesses', 'small industries', and 'small-scale enterprises' are used 
interchangeably in this paper. The cases analyzed are, however, manufacturing enter­
prises. 
3The small-scale sector in India is delineated by investments in plant and machinery (fixed 
capitaO. The investment ceiling has been periodically revised upwards to account for 
developments within this sector and inflation. 
4For a critical evaluation of India's small-scale sector policies refer to: ian M. Little, 
Dipak Mazumdar, and john Page in Small Manufacturing Enterprises: Comparative 
Analysis of India and Other Economies. World Bank: Oxford University Press, 1 987. 
5This view was strongly reflected in several documents produced by international organi-
zations like the International Lagbor Organization (ILO) and United Nations. Refer to 
ILO, Employment Incomes and Equality: A Strategy for lncrrasing Productive Employ­
ment in Kenya, Geneva. 1 972. Also United Nations Industrial Development Organiza­
tion, Subcontracting for Modernizing Economics, 1 974, and Effectiveness of Industrial 
Estates in Developing CDuntrie•, 1 978. 
6rhe use of the term 'dominant classes' in the plural form is unusual in Marxist literature 
but has a certain validity in the Indian context. The reader is referred to Pranab 
Bardhan's The Political Economy of Dewlopment in India, Basil Blackwell, 1 984, for a 
complete critique. 
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7Refer to author's Electronics Policy and the Television Manufacturing Industry. Lessons 
from India's Liberalization Efforts, Institute of Urban and Regional Development, 
Working Paper No. 571 ,  April 1 992. 
8According to a 1 977 survey, only the top 25 percent of metal furniture industries are 
included in the Annual Survey. 
9videocon International claims to have acquired a third of the market share in color tele­
vision. Refer to Business Standard, November 23, 1 989. 
1 OPersonal interviews with office bearers of Indian Television Manufacturers Association. 
1 1  Perhaps the most vocal advocates of 'minimalist governmenr and the destabilizing 
forces inherent in market intervention are the economists from the Neo-Austrian 
school. Readers are referred to a volume edited by K. Croenveld, ). A. H. Maks, and 
). Muysken called Economic Policy and the Market Process: Austrian and Mainstream 
Economics, Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1 990. 
1 2for a formal model of this exposition refer to: Mokhtar M. Metwally, Price and Non­
Price CDmpetition, New York: Asia Publishing House, 1 976. 
1 3for a persuasive explanation of this theory refer to: Donald J. Boudreaux, "Imperfectly 
Competitive firms, Non-Price Competition, and Rent-Seeking, • in journal of lnstitu· 
tiona/ ant/ Theoretical Economics 1 45, 1 989, pp. 597-612. 
1 4Several authors have alluded to this without giving any clear picture about the extent of 
this occurrence. Richard P. and Doris L Taub indicated in their work, called Entrepre­
neurship in India's Small-Scale Industries (New Delhi: Manohar, 1 989), that about . a  
third of their sample of small units were generated through transfers from larger firms 
seeking less regulation and more government subsidies. 
1 5The cost of advertising for the monopolist can be considered small since few others 
can match it and its brand image is clearly far superior. 
1 6Pranab Bardhan. Political Economy of Development in India, op. cit. Ashish Nandy. 
"The Political Culture of the Indian State, • in Daedalus, fall 1 989, pp. 1 -26. 
17 Electronics Policy and the Television Industry. Lessons from India's Liberalization 
Efforts, op.ciL 
1 8From: Economic Sunoey, Ministry of Industry, various issues. 
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